The Post- Conflict Settlements in the World with Particular Reference to Eastern Europe.
Introduction:
Intrastate ethnic conflicts and civil wars are still the prevalent contemporary forms of violent social disruptions and the main causes of the spread of weakened, undermined and/or dysfunctional states. Chances for the termination of violence and the elaboration of some framework for the settlement of grievances and rival claims between the adversaries tend to emerge only with the support, assistance and guarantees of external parties: third states, regional arrangements or universal organisations. The active involvement and the central role of international agencies and third countries may often characterise the process of conflict settlement at any stage from the containment of violence to the formation of agreements: negotiations, mediation, inducement, proposals, compromises with intense pressure and persuasion by external parties. Third party contribution to conflict resolution and peace implementation conveys international status on these intrastate accords (Stern, 2003: 489).
The legal status of "internal agreements" do not constitute an international treaty in the conventional sense between states but accords achieved by a state authority – normally the central government - and political entity(ies)/community(ies) within that state or between various warring communities within a given territory.
Non-state or sub-state entities such as belligerent communities are generally regarded capable of possessing a limited international personality sufficient to enter into binding international agreements or agreements considered binding under international law. Repeated UN Security Council resolutions calling for the full compliance of obligations in a variety of contemporary conflicts also confirm the assumption that these accords of settlement should be treated as matters of international relevance and reasons for international concerns (Csaba, 1988:49).
The endorsement of internal agreements by external – individual states or regional arrangements - actors (as enforcers in Bosnia-Herzegovina or observers and their protectors as in Macedonia) and the participation of regional arrangements in Europe (NATO, EU and OSCE) in the implementation of these peace settlements signal the recognition of these accords as treaties governed by international law (Csaba, 1988:49).
The recognition of internal peace agreements as international accords ascribes internationally accepted and legitimate status to the interests of the parties (ethnic/national communities and/or political factions, movements) to the conflict. The internationalisation of conflict settlement is expected to sustain external commitment, provide guarantees and possible enforcement instruments for the implementation of the indispensable agreed arrangements such as institutionalised protection through constitutional changes, legislative acts and administrative reorganisation. Implementation has proven satisfactory and consistent through the requested assistance and
forceful guarantees of regional arrangements as the crucial source of reassurance and inducement for the parties to fulfil their share of obligations (Csaba, 1988:50).
These immediate and visible guarantees have taken the form of multinational military and police presence on the ground: enforcement potential (mobilised only when necessary as in Bosnia) or the maintenance of international security assistance (protection and extraction if inevitable like in Macedonia) as a token of commitment and supportive means of confidence building measures (safety of observers and monitoring missions) (Csaba, 1988:48).
For reasons of implementation and maintenance, internal peace agreements as settled but often not easily accepted – compromise and predominantly imposed - solutions rely on the supervision, guidance and control of international
- "guardians": multinational forces to protect interim governments (Afghanistan) or international monitors (Macedonia)
- "managers": high or special representatives of universal (UN) and regional (EU) organisations and their advisory bodies (Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo)
- "auditors": international observers and monitors (EU Monitoring Mission).
The full implementation of the rights belonging to various political and/or ethnic communities, most significantly the rights and liberties of ethnic and cultural minorities are generally considered to be the pivotal aspect of the termination and the avoidance of return to violence. The delicate issues related to the claims and concerns of these minorities need careful deliberations and fine balancing acts (Stern, 2003: 485).
The adaptation of one of the central concepts - the balance of power - of international peace treaties to formally non-international conflict settlements in Bosnia and Macedonia became manifest in the form of balanced and protected interests through the imposition of constitutional arrangements intended to establish some equilibrium between the claims to identity and security of different ethnic/national communities.
Compliance and implementation
Some mechanistic concept and construction of a perceived domestic balance do not suffice automatically and at once. Initially the demonstrated and sustained will - as political condition - and capabilities – as instrumental prerequisite – of an international actor – as an external counterbalance – proved vital in order to exert the necessary enforcement in support of the full implementation of the crucial provisions of the agreed conflict settlement framework (Stern, 2003: 484).
The issue of compliance deserves particular examination in the specific context of obligations under internal peace agreements. The implementation of duties and the exercise of rights prescribed or provided by these accords remain precarious even after the adoption and signature of the formal acts of settlement.
The possibility of enforcement – as latent or implicit deterrent against sabotage and obstruction by any of the parties – can complement and bolster the voluntary steps and measures of implementation by the parties. In the wake of violent conflicts the former adversaries regularly prove to be reluctant to fully or partly comply with their obligations without external incentives or inducement (Stern, 2003: 484).
At a later stage of the progress from peace implementation to state-building, the instalment or restoration of fundamental sovereign functions of state authority (the monopoly of legitimate violence as of primary importance) yields meaningful and sustainable solutions only in accordance with the reallocation of sovereign competencies between the constitutional levels and constituent national communities (minority/majority).
The satisfactory implementation of framework arrangements if not treated as static, but rather flexible in their adaptation is likely to lead to the consolidation of peace (elimination of violence as negative peace) and create security assurances (positive peace) through the introduction of constitutional adjustments and reorganised order introducing the conditions of avoidance and pacific resolution of conflicts.
Protective institutional changes as legitimate and potentially effective remedy for minority grievances
Gradual implementation of peace settlements through constitutional (re)construction and profound political changes characteristically mark the completion of the transformative process conceived to establish a more peaceful society and its institutions. The depth of changes can be best measured by the possibilities of effective and institutional protection of the rights of ethnic minorities as well as their participation as means of reconciliation and representation (Stern, 2003: 487).
The durability and viability of framework agreements on the settlement of ethnic conflicts are undeniably the most precarious and uncharted aspects of the adopted general recipe. The consociation model as applied to the conditions left behind by armed confrontations and violent hostilities in deeply divided societies may legitimately be seen as an experimental product of "international social engineering" by the proponents of supposedly benevolent concepts (Stern, 2003: 486).
One salient issue stands out in this context: the international authority and legitimacy of these solutions beyond the mere capacity and power to infuse constitutional arrangements and impose institutional edifice. In both cases – in Bosnia and in Macedonia as well – the constitutional solutions favoured by Western governments and moulded in the framework agreements forged at Dayton (1995) and at Ohrid (2001) respectively represented the priorities and expectations of the Atlantic community – the European Union and non-European NATO members alike – towards local political communities. Persuasion, pressure and imposition all gained legitimacy through the agreements of the conflicting parties and the invitation by the internationally recognised governments to regional arrangements endowed with the capacity to furnish the necessary security instruments of implementation and pacification(Stern, 2003).
The extended concept of the EU as a "normative power" ("Europeanisation of conflict resolution")
According to Stern (2003: 486) the EU as a peculiar regional arrangement with its evolving full-spectrum security arsenal – political and economic, civil and military means – in co-operation with the Transatlantic defence alliance (NATO) has embarked on the assisted implementation and enforced maintenance of two constituent elements (the Dayton Agreement for Bosnia and the Ohrid Framework Agreement in Macedonia) of the security arrangement for the Western Balkans. The normative influence of the EU can be properly assessed through the examination of the shape, content and viability of peace agreements as essential components of a regional security regime.
Constitutional corrections or redefinition of legitimate policies for political communities in the conflicts of Bosnia and Macedonia by means of peace agreements with the supervision of external organisations (UN, NATO, EU) sought to introduce some equitable ethnic/national minority representation, educational and administrative rights and self-governance, integration into the security forces (participation in control and exercise of the monopoly of the use of legitimate violence as guarantee against its abuse).
The ambitious normative agenda of EU CFSP aspires to transform international as well as internal/domestic relations of states prone to violent clash of contending ethnic and political narratives primarily in the regions adjacent to the frontiers of the European Union or in some more distant areas, but adversely affecting strategic interests of the EU as a whole. The driving principle of these endeavours corresponds to the defining rationale of interstate relations within the EU: the substitution of right for might, the exercise of power by the rule of law and within an agreed institutional framework instead of crude power struggles (Stern, 2003: 486).
Besides the most important EU mission, the "domestication and assimilation" of additional zones of Europe through the enlargement of the Union, the promotion of complex conflict resolution and state consolidation as "mission civilisatrice" emerged to complete the original "normative international agenda" of the European Union (Stern, 2003: 486).
The prospect of partnership and eventually perhaps membership has remained the eminent and most powerful incentive in the Balkans to induce political compromises, cohesion and co-operation primarily within multiethnic states, but also between the countries of the region. No stabilisation and association agreement was conceivable as long as countries remain engulfed in division, potential return to violent conflict and ethnic hostilities. The journeys towards co-operation and partnership through peace implementation and political consolidation in Bosnia and Macedonia testified to the benefits of commitments to agreed settlements and external assistance (Stern, 2003: 488).
In case of the unsettled conflicts in the "European neighbourhood" east of the Union, the European method - established and repeatedly applied during the second half of the 20th century – to pacify former antagonists and eliminate conditions of potential destabilisation through absorption and transformation cannot be utilised in the absence of prospect for candidacy and ultimately membership in the EU (Stern, 2003: 490).
Unlike the process of enlargement, in the course of regional peacemaking and peace-building the crucial normative influence of the European Union is not exercised by the projection and transfer of its own legal order (acquis communutaire), but through the establishment of new internal constitutional structures and the redistribution of rights as well as duties among conflicting communities within the preserved territorial unity of one state.
The promotion/imposition of these social designs and patterns of ethnic coexistence has so far resulted in two complex and ongoing experiments in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Macedonia. Member States of the European Union support EU engagements and operational involvement in the Balkans in hope of transforming the entire region into a more balanced and predictable neighbourhood in line with the aspirations stated in the European Security Strategy. "Resolving other people's conflicts and promoting democracy" motivated EU decisions to assume political and military responsibility for security operations in Macedonia and Bosnia. The actions pursued and the instruments deployed by the EU in the Balkans during the last few years revealed that the Union has not only moved from "providing relief and aid" to "promoting democracy" but (practically since 2003) shifted to "prevention and rehabilitation efforts" by all means in support of conflict management operations as instruments of state- and peace-building intentions (Stern, 2003: 489).
Legal precedent and political prescription for conflict settlement and lasting prevention beyond the Balkans
Since the risks and security implications of weakened, fragile or, at least partially, incapacitated states on the European security perimeter represent a shared security concern, the search for applicable models and patterns of solution could greatly benefit from positive examples drawn from different regions, but with very similar underlying issues at the sources of instability and insecurity.
Although the developments in the Balkans have been shaped by particular and characteristic conditions, the experiences and lessons learned in the course of crisis management could be of broader utility particularly in the European neighbourhood. These lessons extend to the issues of self-determination and ethnic conflict, their mediated and designed settlements, as well as their implementation with international guarantees and peace support operations (security assistance and enforcement).
If one recipe (negotiations with mediation, constitutional rearrangement, guarantees and rewards, external participation in the implementation) for conflict resolution has already proved its utility in promoting security and more stable governance in multiethnic political communities in one troubled region (in our case in the Western Balkans), the essential elements of the solution might be adaptable to the conditions of conflicts in other areas (in the South Caucasus and on the eastern littoral of the Dnester river) with commensurate issues fuelling unsettled adversities. The legitimacy and feasibility of previous instances of the dissolution of tensions and the reconciliation of conflicting demands relies on the essential support, participation and active contribution of the institutions of the Western security community (Stern, 2003: 488).
The resolutions promoted by the European Union and NATO has represented the Western aspirations to introduce and consolidate those conditions and institutions that would bring about the emergence of "positive-sum" situations with gains for the all the former belligerent parties. The resulting "positive peace" surpassing by far the conventional (realist) purpose of settlements - the elimination of the immediate threat or use of violence from a conflict – pursues the ambitious agenda of state transformation and constitutional redefinition/rearrangement in order to consolidate and cement the achievements of an internationally assured resolution.
The "frozen" separatist and ethnic conflicts on the western and southern perimeter of the former Soviet empire - in Moldova (Transdnistria), in Georgia (Akhbazia and South-Ossetia) and also in Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabah) – as still unsettled challenges may offer opportunities for another application of the recipe – the procedural solution and substantial components as well – elaborated and put to the test in the former Yugoslavia.
The same prescription of constitutional recognition and representation of minority rights coupled with territorial autonomy may well also serve to prevent the deterioration in other vestiges of ethnic resentment/tension, preserve and promote the rights of historic ethnic minorities (Stern, 2003: 487).
The political, military and policing experience accumulated during the phased and sustained engagements in the Balkans may serve as the eminent source of lessons and conclusions for other potential involvements in very real areas of conflict. For the coming years the Black Sea basin ought to be the most pressing focus of attention, efforts and means of crisis settlement and post-conflict reconstruction by the EU in concert with NATO. On the opposite shores of the Black Sea, "dormant" or "frozen conflicts – in Transdnistria, Akhbazia, South-Ossetia and Karabah - await constructive and complex international engagements and arrangements in order to close these "black holes" in international security on the Eastern perimeter of the pursued "European zone of peace and stability".
References
Csaba, T. (1988) The extension of the normative influence of the European
Union through pacification and state-building in the Balkans and possibly
beyond. New York. St Martins. P 49-50.
Stern, R. (2003) The European Union: towards a strategic culture? Security
Dialogue, Vol. 34 No 483-490.
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